He also tells a very interesting personal story of his battles to get these trajectories used, and how he was able to save the Hiten spacecraft and get it to the moon. This is a great story, and he tells it very well.

According to Pew Research studies, most Americans think religion always conflicts with science. The popular writings of scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Lawrence Krauss reinforce this idea, as do books by writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennet. Furthermore, the two versions of the enormously popular television show Cosmos, hosted by Carl Sagan in 1980 and Neil deGrasse Tyson in 2014, present a history of science in which religion has always acted as a (...) barrier to scientific development, with scientists frequently persecuted or even executed for their work. "Gods, Philosophers, and Scientists" shows that just because an idea is popular, doesn't mean it's correct. By examining the historical record from the time of the Ancient Greeks to today, readers are able to see that religion and science have been allies more often than enemies, and when conflict does occur it's too simplistic to view it as coming from something inherent to either science or religion. Instead, as with the case of Greek philosophy or the reception of Darwinian evolution, complex social forces are to blame, and in cases such as the infamous one of Galileo's conflict with the Catholic Church, clashing personalities are at least as important as those social forces. Anyone interested in the history of science or religion, who is curious about how science works, or who wants to have a better understanding of the world should read this book. (shrink)

A new pragmatic approach, based on the latest developments in argumentation theory, analyzing appeal to expert opinion as a form of argument. Reliance on authority has always been a common recourse in argumentation, perhaps never more so than today in our highly technological society when knowledge has become so specialized—as manifested, for instance, in the frequent appearance of "expert witnesses" in courtrooms. When is an appeal to the opinion of an expert a reasonable type of argument to make, and when (...) does it become a fallacy? This book provides a method for the evaluation of these appeals in everyday argumentation. Specialized domains of knowledge such as science, medicine, law, and government policy have gradually taken over as the basis on which many of our rational decisions are made daily. Consequently, appeal to expert opinion in these areas has become a powerful type of argument. Challenging an argument based on expert scientific opinion, for example, has become as difficult as it once was to question religious authority. Walton stresses that even in cases where expert opinion is divided, the effect of it can still be so powerful that it overwhelms an individual's ability to make a decision based on personal deliberation of what is right or wrong in a given situation. The book identifies the requirements that make an appeal to expert opinion a reasonable or unreasonable argument. Walton's new pragmatic approach analyzes that appeal as a distinctive form of argument, with an accompanying set of appropriate critical questions matching the form. Throughout the book, a historical survey of the key developments in the evolution of the argument from authority, dating from the time of the ancients, is given, and new light is shed on current problems of "junk science" and battles between experts in legal argumentation. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable? Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He carries his (...) analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test. (shrink)

Researchers consistently report that individuals see themselves acting far more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviors. They suggest that this belief encourages unethical conduct and contributes to the degeneration of business ethics; however, they have not specifically investigated the consequences of this belief. If undesirable work behaviors actually do occur, educators and other ethics advocates would be strongly encouraged to dispel this widely held notion.In the present study, data was collected from college students and practicing (...) accountants regarding how they and others would respond to ten ethical scenarios. Participants' perceptions were calculated and correlated to their decision in a hypothetical business case. Analysis indicated that individuals, regardless of age, gender, or work status, see themselves acting far more ethically than others. It also disclosed significant association between participants' own attitudes and the case response, but no significant association between the response and their attitudes relative to those perceived to be held by others. Believing that everyone else is less ethical, therefore, appears to have little impact on work behavior. (shrink)

In a recent paper “Safety, Sensitivity, and Differential Support” (Synthese, December 2017), Jose Zalabardo argues that (contra Sosa in Philos Perspect 33(13):141–153,1999) sensitivity can be differentially supported as the correct requirement for propositional knowledge. Zalabardo argues that safety fails to dominate sensitivity; specifically: some cases of knowledge failure can only be explained by sensitivity. In this paper, I resist Zalabardo’s conclusion that domination failure confers differential support for sensitivity. Specifically, I argue that counterexamples to sensitivity undermine differential support for sensitivity. (...) Using Zalabardo’s modal framework, I consider a less demanding modal condition, what I call weak sensitivity, and I explain how weak sensitivity avoids an influential counterexample to sensitivity. However, I argue that we can subvert that counterexample only by abandoning Zalabardo’s case for domination failure. So either way, we cannot differentially support sensitivity. (shrink)

The biobank consent debate is one with deeply held convictions on both the ‘broad’ and ‘specific’ side with little sign of resolution. Recently, Thomas Ploug and Soren Holm have developed an alternative to both specific and broad consent: a meta‐consent framework. The aim here is to consider whether meta‐consent provides a ‘solution’ to the biobank consent debate. We clarify what ‘meta‐consent’ actually is (arguing that the label is a misnomer and ‘consent à la carte’ is more accurate). We identify problems (...) with Ploug and Holm's arguments, and some challenges for meta‐consent. We focus on whether there is any ethical obligation to provide consent à la carte. There may seem to be so, especially if we draw upon an unclear appeal to the ethical significance of ‘respect for autonomy’. Similarly, there might seem to be an intuitive inference from the fact that ethically legitimate research requires informed consent to the conclusion that it thereby requires consent à la carte. It is shown that this line of inference is mistaken. (shrink)

Some 20 years ago Todd and colleagues proposed that rhythm perception is mediated by the conjunction of a sensory representation of the auditory input and a motor representation of the body (Todd, 1994a, 1995 ), and that a sense of motion from sound is mediated by the vestibular system (Todd, 1992a, 1993b ). These ideas were developed into a sensory-motor theory of rhythm and beat induction (Todd et al., 1999 ). A neurological substrate was proposed which might form the biological (...) basis of the theory (Todd et al., 2002 ). The theory was implemented as a computational model and a number of experiments conducted to test it. In the following time there have been several key developments. One is the demonstration that the vestibular system is primal to rhythm perception, and in related work several experiments have provided further evidence that rhythm perception is body dependent. Another is independent advances in imaging, which have revealed the brain areas associated with both vestibular processing and rhythm perception. A third is the finding that vestibular receptors contribute to auditory evoked potentials (Todd et al., 2014a, b ). These behavioral and neurobiological developments demand a theoretical overview which could provide a new synthesis over the domain of rhythm perception. In this paper we suggest four propositions as the basis for such a synthesis. (1) Rhythm perception is a form of vestibular perception; (2) Rhythm perception evokes both external and internal guidance of somatotopic representations; (3) A link from the limbic system to the internal guidance pathway mediates the “dance habit”; (4) The vestibular reward mechanism is innate. The new synthesis provides an explanation for a number of phenomena not often considered by rhythm researchers. We discuss these along with possible computational implementations and alternative models and propose a number of new directions for future research. (shrink)

This paper focuses on how Soldiers make hard choices between competing options. To understand the psychological processes behind these types of decisions, we present qualitative data collected from...

ABSTRACT In A Metaphysics for Freedom and related papers, Helen Steward advances a new argument for incompatibilism. Though she concedes that the luck objection is persuasive with regard to existing versions of libertarianism, she claims that agency itself is incompatible with determinism: we are only agents at all if we are able to settle matters concerning our movements, where settling something requires that prior to our settling it lacked sufficient conditions. She argues that genuine agents settle very fine-grained aspects of (...) their movements: when and how they move, even when and how their neurons fire. In this paper, I advance two linked arguments against agency incompatibilism. I argue, first, that we do not exercise direct control over the fine-grained aspects of our movements. Rather, we control these movements indirectly, by intentionally engaging in broadly individuated action types. Second, I argue that these aspects of our movements are lucky for us and, since this is true, they cannot play the role of grounding our agency. (shrink)

Advancing a creolizing reading of the eighteenth-century philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, this volume explores Rousseau’s strong resonances in Caribbean thought and politics.

ABSTRACT The author proposes to convert Ayn Rand’s theory of man into a sixth branch of her Objectivist philosophy called the metaphysics of man. This branch would be distinct from both the metaphysics of reality and epistemology. Along with consolidating all the axioms about the fundamental nature of man, this new framework will simplify and clarify the structure of Objectivism.

Sex offender registries have given way to residency restrictions for people convicted of sex crimes in many communities in the US. Research suggests, however, that such restrictions can actually undermine the safety of the communities they are ostensibly meant to protect. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, this essay explores why such restrictions, and strategies like them, fail and are bound to fail. Then, it considers the work of generationFIVE, an organization that seeks to eliminate child sexual abuse in (...) five generations, to explore modes of response to sexual abuse and assault that build community safety. (shrink)

This article is a response to some of the criticisms made of How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions? by Gerstenberger, Post and Riley. In particular, it focuses on two issues of definition – that of capitalism and the capitalist nation-state – which arise from the book’s ‘consequentialist’ claim that bourgeois revolutions are defined by a particular outcome: the establishment of nation-states dedicated to the accumulation of capital.

Howard Robinson has argued that even if the major claims of Berkeleian idealism are mistaken, including its account of the “physical world,” “the overall endeavour of defending idealism is more plausible than it is generally believed to be”. He argues that aspects of Berkeley’s arguments for idealism, including a Berkeleian argument against naive realism, can be shown to refute the representative realist’s view of perception, and its concomitant ontology. This ontology is at least partially materialist. According to Robinson, once naive (...) realism is disposed of and the objections to RR are exposed, Berkeleian Idealism can raise its shadowy head with at least the respectability afforded the currently more fashionable Representationalism. We shall argue that Robinson’s claim cannot plausibly be sustained. His defense of Berkeleian idealism, based in part on his understanding of naive realism and his critique of Representationalism, falters. “The overall endeavour of defending idealism” is not as plausible as Robinson takes it to be. (shrink)

This anthology concerns limit-decision problems, chiefly as treated in the fourteenth-century Latin West. A central problem taken up concerns the instant of change: in a change from ø to not-ø such that before instant t there is ø and after t not-ø, at t is there ø, or not-ø, or neither, or both? For medieval thinkers, the answer often depended on what kind of item was at issue. They standardly distinguished permanent items, the whole of which exists simultaneously, from successive (...) items, whose parts are non-simultaneous, and gave different type or type answers in the two cases.The papers in... (shrink)

The concepts of health and disease are foundational to biomedical ethics. This essay critiques two widely used approaches to understanding health and disease: the World Health Organization definition of health as "complete physical, mental and social well-being," and the attempts by Thomas Szasz and Christopher Boorse to define health and disease in objective, value-free terms. Drawing particularly on the thought of Karl Barth, I argue that in Christian perspective, health must be understood in terms of the goods and goals toward (...) which human life is directed, which must themselves be understood in terms of God's good purposes made known in Christ. We are called to "will to be healthy" and resist disease, but understanding what this entails in particular concrete situations requires skills and habits of attentiveness to God's command, cultivated in the context of the Christian community and its practices. (shrink)

This paper offers an original solution to the problem of the many, built on a foundation of powers-based causation. At its most basic, the solution should be understood as a type of maximality response, and on those grounds its originality might be questioned. However, it is argued that novelty of the solution owes as much to the meta-metaphysical context in which the solution is framed as it does the model of causal powers. A discussion of paradigms in metaphysics is included.

The ArgumentPressures to lower health-care costs remain an important stimulus to eugenic approaches. Prenatal diagnosis followed by abortion of affected fetuses has replaced sterilization as the major eugenic technique. Voluntary acceptance has replaced coercion, but subtle pressures undermine personal autonomy. The failure of the old eugenics to accurately predict who will have affected offspring virtually disappears when prenatal diagnosis is used to predict Mendelian disorders. However, when prenatal diagnosis is used to detect inherited susceptibilities to adult-onset, common, complex disorders, considerable (...) uncertainty is inherent in the prediction. Intolerance and the resurgence of genetic determinism are current pressures for a eugenic approach. The increasing use of carrier screening and of prenatal diagnosis could itself generate intolerance for those who refuse the procedures. Genetic determinism deflects society from social action that would reduce the burden of disease far more than even the maximum use of eugenics. (shrink)

(2011). Higher Education and International Student Mobility in the Global Knowledge Economy. By K. Guruz. British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 59, Research capacity building, pp. 355-357.

Hume is normally—and in my view, correctly—taken to be a legal conventionalist. However, the nature of Hume's conventionalism has not been well understood. Scholars have often interpreted David Hume as being largely indifferent to the specifics of the laws, so long as they accomplish their basic task of protecting people's property. I argue that this is not correct. Hume thinks certain systems of law will accomplish their purpose, of coordinating people's behaviour for the benefit of all, better than others. He (...) introduces two concepts, which I call generality and convenience, to designate those features of the law that allow it to best accomplish its purpose. Of the two, generality is the more important. The ability to implement a system of what Hume calls “general laws” is a feature common to those governments he considers “civilized” rather than “barbarous.” A set of more specific criteria may be extracted from Hume's texts, which laws must meet if they are to be considered general. Many of the criteria Hume identifies later become associated with theorists of the so-called “rule of law.” Hume's conventionalism can thus be read an important development beyond that of Hobbes, one that lays a foundation upon which later theorists such as A.V. Dicey are able to build. (shrink)

Ayn Rand’s Objectivism holds a foundationalist view of knowledge—that knowledge is hierarchical, with the less basic supported by inference from the more basic, which is known directly. But two very different forms of foundationalism (deductive and presuppositional) are observable in Objectivism, and vestiges of deductivism, which Rand explicitly rejected, can be found in attempts to systematize her philosophy. This article attempts to resolve conflicts between the two approaches. It endorses presuppositional foundationalism and suggests that Rand’s view be modified accordingly.

This article discusses the "pinioning" of birds in English zoos. Pinioning is the partial amputation of a bird’s wing and renders the individual permanently flightless. Around 5,650 birds have been pinioned in five Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (WWT) zoos in England. Licenses are held by the WWT under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 to allow the shooting of free-living birds in order to prevent interference with the captive pinioned birds. The associated practices of pinioning and shooting are considered in (...) legal and ethical contexts. It is concluded that there is no compelling case to support the continuation of pinioning. (shrink)

In the mid-1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical efforts toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This article explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. It argues that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as philosophers. The fourth (...) type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history. (shrink)

This chapter critiques a recent defense of the anti-rape movement by Carrie N. Baker and Maria Bevacqua that is symptomatic of white feminism’s understanding of violence and the state. I critique Baker and Bevacqua’s piece for its “knowing, loving ignorance,” as defined by Marianna Ortega. I reach this diagnosis by examining how Baker and Bevacqua use the work of women of color to substantiate their own narrative of the anti-rape movement while distorting the critical and constructive work done by the (...) very people and organizations they cite. I conclude that until there is an ongoing practice of accountability for the history of anti-violence movement collusion with state violence, white feminists should not take leadership roles in policy decisions. (shrink)